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The Negotiation Culture of Lengthy Peace
Processes: Cyprus as an Example of
Spoiling that Prevents a Final Solution
A. MARCO TURK*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the first of two earlier articles for this law review
considering the Cyprus Problem and the potential for peaceful
reunification of the historically divided island, this author argued
for utilization of connecting and communicating skills by members
of the Cypriot civil society to achieve what was referred to as the
Seven Keys to Peacebuilding. This approach, known as the Track
III or community-based approach, is bottom-up, as opposed to the
top-down process of traditional elite diplomacy customarily applied
to resolve international disputes. So far, the community-based
approach has not been endorsed and the virtual stalemate between
the opposing elements of traditional elite diplomacy regarding
Cyprus reunification continues to exist.1
The second article suggests that the dynamics of the Cyprus
conflict must be changed if there is to be hope for success
concerning any future UN-brokered peace solution that might be
proposed. This would require a new peace environment that
advances the best interests of all parties. Even though it is too late
to avert the conflict, the question posed was whether it is too late
to intervene with a creative new approach. The article concluded
J.D. cum laude (Southwestern University School of Law), B.A. (University of
Washington). Program director and professor of negotiation, conflict resolution and
peacebuilding, California State University Dominguez Hills. Since my 1997-1999 Fulbright
Senior Scholar award in conflict resolution on Cyprus, my international peacebuilding
efforts have been concentrated on that island (five return trips in 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005,
2008, plus work with Cypriots in the USA).
1. A. Marco Turk, Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for
Track III Diplomacy as the Best Approach for Successful Negotiation of This Ethnic
Conflict, 28 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 205 (2006).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
that the answer would be determined by whether the bottom-up
approach works, because the success of any solution rests with the
people who will have to live with it. In the case of the Cyprus
peace process, the indicators continued to infer that the virtual
stalemate between the opposing elements of traditional elite
diplomacy regarding reunification might result in the current de
facto partition of the island becoming de jure.2
This third and final Article in the series (1) examines the
current view of the problem, (2) considers Cyprus as an example
of traditional spoiling in the negotiation culture of lengthy peace
processes, (3) explores the absence of civil society representation
at the bargaining table as a negative impact on the potential for
settlement, (4) evaluates suggestions for an approach to
management of the pre-negotiation process to effectively facilitate
the positive outcome of subsequent negotiations, and (5)
concludes that the best hope for reunification of the island of
Cyprus rests at the grassroots level in the hands of the people on
both sides, who need to change the game through conflict
transformation from the bottom-up.
Cyprus is a small island in the eastern Mediterranean whose
population consists of a Greek heritage majority and a minority of
Turkish descent, which was controlled by the British for a period
approaching 100 years.3 Historically, Greek Cypriots have leaned
toward a union with Greece while Turkish Cypriots sought
partition.4 The landmark dates in the separation of an island that
"is too small for continued division"5 are:
* 1955 - Negotiations between Britain, Greece and
Turkey fail.6
* 1959 - Settlement finally is reached.'
* 1960 -Cyprus officially receives its independence.!
2. A. Marco Turk, Rethinking the Cyprus Problem: Are Frame-Breaking Changes
Still Possible Through Application of Intractable Conflict Intervention Approaches to This
"Hurting Stalemate?" 29 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 463 (2007) [hereinafter
Rethinking the Cyprus Problem].
3. STEVEN D. STRAUSS, THE COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO WORLD CONFLICTS
219 (2002).
4. Id. at 219-20.
5. Id. at 220.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. GREECE, TURKEY, CYPRUS: TRIANGLE OF CONFLICT - AND OPPORTUNITY 1
(Richard Buckley ed., 1998) [hereinafter TRIANGLE OF CONFLICT- AND OPPORTUNITY].
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* 1963 - Notwithstanding Greek Cypriot guarantees
intended to protect Turkish Cypriots, significant
fighting erupts between the two communities.'
* 1964 - United Nations sends peacekeeping troops to
bolster British soldiers at the "Green Line" (or
"Buffer Zone") established to separate the two
communities in conflict. 0
* 1974 - Greek Cypriot army officer orchestrated coup
supported by the military government of Greece fails
but Turkey sends troops to Cyprus claiming that they
were needed to protect Turkish Cypriots, resulting in
Turkey's eventual control of approximately one-third
of the island, effectively partitioning it and displacing
200,000 Greek Cypriots under a UN cease-fire that
permitted Turkey to keep its troops in the areas then
under its control."
* 1983 - The Turkish-held area becomes known as the
"Turkish Federated State of Cyprus," and later as the
"Turkish Republic of Northern' Cyprus" (TRNC in
1991). 12
* 1990s (late) - Approximately more than 50% of the
TRNC population consists of "settlers" (immigrants)
from Turkey in addition to the 35,000 Turkish
soldiers. 13
* 2001 - The UN Security Council renews its 36-year
mission on the island as the home for 2,400
peacekeepers patrolling the Green Line, accompanied
by Turkey's warning of the possibility of its annexing
the Turkish Cypriot north. 1
* 2001 - For the first time since 1974, the two leaders
(Turkish Cypriot Rauf Denktash and Greek Cypriot
Glafkos Clerides) meet for dinner in the south, "an
unheard of, landmark event," signaling what after 25
9. STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 220.
10. Id. at 221.
11. Id. at 220-21.
12. Id. at 221.
13. Id.
14. Id.
2009]
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years could be significant progress toward a possible
solution to the deadlock. 
* 2003 - The Green Line checkpoint is opened so that
Cypriots may go back-and-forth between the two
communities. 6
* 2004 - Turkish Cypriots vote 65% (64.9%) to approve
the Annan Plan and reunification; Greek Cypriots
vote 76% (75.8%) against it.'
7
* 2010 - As of the date of final submission of this article
there has been no "mutually acceptable resolution"
achieved, nor has any "new platform" been "created
[for] improved conditions for mutual understanding."
Greece, Turkey and Cyprus create a "triangle of conflict" as
well as opportunity. 8 There has been a troubled history of this
relationship, but the problem created by the Cyprus division
caused an escalation in the tension that frustrated all attempts by
the international community to achieve a settlement. ' How the
problem can be resolved remains a mystery.2 Greece and the
Republic of Cyprus have a mutual defense agreement, as do
Turkey and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC). 21 Each side of the dispute remains resistant to
movement and the status quo appears to be interminable, unless
war or a cooperative change in approach occurs.22
Since 1963, discussions concerning the Cyprus Problem have
centered on extensive political analysis of the division and the
15. Id. at 221-22. Potential impetus for the meeting appears to have been European
Union (EU) membership for Cyprus on the horizon, possible damage to Turkey's own EU
membership hopes if a divided island were admitted to the EU while Turkey was "an
occupying power," and the desire of Denktash to reach a settlement before he would
retire from office in 2003 at the age of 83. Following the dinner, an enthusiastic Turkish
Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, proclaimed that, "[a] mutually acceptable resolution should
be achieved before the end of 2002. We have a new platform which has created improved
conditions for mutual understanding."
16. HARRY ANASTASIOU, THE BROKEN OLIVE BRANCH: NATIONALISM, ETHNIC
CONFLICT, AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN CYPRUS. V.2 NATIONALISM VERSUS
EUROPEANIZATION 72 (2008), http://digilib.syr.edu/u?/su-press,307.
17. Id. at 139.
18. See generally TRIANGLE OF CONFLICT - AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 8
(arguing that all three countries would suffer greatly from an escalation of conflict and
benefit enormously from reconciliation).
19. Id. at Introduction.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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consistent efforts to categorize each failed opportunity as being at
"a critical stage" in the negotiation process. ' For approximately 25
years the UN has unsuccessfully attempted to achieve settlement
of this increasingly intractable conflict, but nothing seems to have
worked. 2 The only apparent result is a regular "digging in of the
heels" from both sides as their respective positions become more
hardened with the passage of time. This has resulted in a period
"where groups and the public have no enthusiasm for a solution." 25
So long as the leaders of both sides (now Turkish Cypriot Mehmet
Ali Talat and Greek Cypriot Demetris Christofias) deal with the
same issues of the past ("dead junk") as the way to a solution
"rather than bring people together," nothing will change.26
II. CURRENT VIEW OF THE PROBLEM
In response to my suggestion for a "bottom-up" approach
rather than a continuation of the traditional political elite "top-
down" approach, it has been said that the objectives of Christofias
and Talat are reflective of the interests and underlying needs of
the majority of the people on both sides of the Green Line that
divides the two communities.27 Further, if "ordinary" Greek and
Turkish Cypriots were to meet and begin negotiating a settlement,
they would start where the two leaders are currently toiling.' This
is based on the belief that the two leaders and their respective
community establishments possess "the political experience and
realism to see they cannot get from negotiations what they would
ideally like, given the present balance of military and diplomatic
forces at their disposal," as was the case with their predecessors.29
And these two leaders believe that they can achieve an agreement
that would be preferable to the present circumstances as well as
supported by "clear majorities in their communities."30
23. See, e.g., Niyazi Kizilyurek, Cyprus Silently Begins Year 2009, CYPRUS
OBSERVER, Jan. 9, 2009,
http://www.observercyprus.com/observer/NewsDetails.aspx?id=3382#.
24. See Zenon Stavrinides, The Underlying Assumptions, Structure and Prospects of
the Negotiating Process for a Cyprus Settlement, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF CYPRESS STUDIES 69 (Ulker Vanci Osam, ed., 2008).
25. Kizilyurk, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. See E-mail from Dr. Zenon Stravrinides, School of Politics and International
Studies, University of Leeds (Sept. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
2009]
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The two communities must resolve many issues on which they
still stand far apart. Not the least of these are:31
* Creation of a power-sharing formula that each can
accept and with which each will be comfortable and
secure.
* Removal of those settlers (immigrants) from Turkey
who have increasingly populated the island since 1974.
" Freedom of movement, settlement, and property
ownership throughout the island by both communities.
• Compensation for property losses resulting from
division of the island.
* Right of return to property owned on the other side.
* Searching and accounting for missing persons.
* Recognition of pre-partition injustices committed by
each community against the other.
" Security concerns harbored by each community
concerning the other (e.g., Greek Cypriots unease over
the continued presence of Turkish troops and Turkish
Cypriot fears of once again becoming the minority on
a reunified island).
* Whether to use the most recent version of the Annan
Plan as the basis to restart negotiations or find some
other basis (Greek Cypriots wanting nothing to do
with the plan at all, and Turkish Cypriots preferring to
start from that document).
Each community has its own perception of the problem, its
origin, and how to properly and justly settle it.32 Perhaps this
difference in outlook has its roots in the 825-year history of the
island's occupation or semi-occupation (excepting only the years
1960-1974) by non-Cypriots. "3 Beginning in 1963, fulfillment of the
basic needs of each community has been "spoiled" by internal and
external forces. ' On one side, there are the Greek Cypriots
convinced of the superiority of the cause they espouse; on the
other, there are the Turkish Cypriots who harbor fears of once
31. While the reunification debate could encompass other issues, these are the ones
that appear with regularity when discussions occur concerning possible solutions to the
Cyprus Problem.
32. See Stavrinides, supra note 24.
33. See A. Marco Turk, Is Cypriot Unification Possible?, NEW STATESMAN, Aug. 19,
2008, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/europe/2008/08/cyprus-conflict-cypriots.
34.. Id.
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again being dominated by the other community and a return of the
unacceptable status quo that favored the Greek Cypriots in 1963. "
Making an accommodation even more difficult are issues such as
increasing construction on Greek Cypriot land in the Turkish
Cypriot community for use by non-Greek Cypriots, repatriation to
Turkey of the approximately 250,000 Turkish settlers/immigrants
on the island, the claim by Turkey that Cyprus is an imperative
consideration regarding Turkey's security, and the Turkish Cypriot
indication that it would be a good idea to break up the island and
begin again. "
The large majority of Greek Cypriots believe that they were
wronged by the arrival of Turkish troops in 1974 and their
continued presence on the northern portion of the island that
Turkish Cypriots still control.37 Greek Cypriots want the troops
removed and the island returned, to the extent possible, to its
geographical and political status before it was altered in 1974.38 In
addition, they want guarantees that this will not occur again. 39 On
the other hand, Turkish Cypriots believe that the problem was
created far earlier than 1974. According to them, it was the result
of the 1963-1964 intercommunal disruption that reduced the
Turkish Cypriots to minority status in the course of Greek Cypriot
efforts to unite with Greece.4" Turkish Cypriots will not agree to
return to their earlier minority status, nor will they accept
withdrawal of Turkish troops in the absence of a negotiated
bizonal bicommunal federation supported internationally.42 Such
an arrangement that would have established two separate states
under the umbrella of a federal government capable of
representing the island internationally was approved by Turkish
Cypriots, but rejected by Greek Cypriots at the April 24, 2004,
referenda voting. '3 While Greek Cypriots have not been successful
in obtaining international or third-party support for removal of the
Turkish troops, neither have the Turkish Cypriots been able to
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Stavrinides, supra note 24.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 69.
42. Id. at 69-70.
43. Id. at 70.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
succeed in getting any country other than Turkey to recognize and
deal with them under the current circumstances."
The structure of the negotiations that took place between
1975 and 2004 can be examined in terms of various "underlying
assumptions."" These include: 
46
" Each side desires to obtain that to which it feels it has
a right.
* No concern is exhibited for what is mutually
beneficial.
* A zero-sum 7 bargaining approach is taken.
* Neither community is willing to relinquish certain
advantages obtained by them as a result of the
division.
Greek Cypriots must decide between insisting on "the
Greekness of the Republic of Cyprus," a stable and strong
economy with its high standard of living, and the "empty rhetoric"
of "'struggle' and 'justice,""'4 or a bizonal, bicommunal federal
republic that will require equally sharing with Turkish Cypriots the
new republic's powers and responsibilities along with its economic
benefits that now include EU membership. " The latter will require
not just creating a new relationship across the Green Line, but also
reaching out across the Mediterranean to Turkey,50 where there is
a perceived threat posed by a potentially hostile Cyprus.5 This
perception was exacerbated in the late 1990s when Greek Cypriots
purchased ground-to-air missiles from Russia, which caused
Turkey to respond with threats to destroy the missile sites and
emphasize integration of the TRNC with mainland Turkey. 52 This
would be accomplished by increasing the number of Turkish
settlers, who had been moving to the island since 1974, in spite of
UN condemnation of such a policy."
Turkish Cypriots are beyond where they were in the early
days of the negotiations following the division. They are
44. Id.
45. Id. at 77.
46. Id. at 77-78.
47. Id. at 78. Basically, all for one side and none for the other.
48. Id. at 97.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. TRIANGLE OF CONFLICT- AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 8, at 10.
52. Id. at 6-7.
53. Id. at Introduction.
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"politically and economically stronger" now than during earlier
efforts to solve the problem.5' Perhaps they are waiting for some
recognition from Islamic countries and links with EU members in
order to improve their bargaining position.'5 The bottom line is
that each side will need to decide what its best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA) will be. Unless both sides decide
concurrently that "on balance" a negotiated agreement will be
better than their respective default positions, once again there will
be no settlement. 56
So where does all this leave the problem that has divided
Cyprus since the Turkish troops arrived in 1974, which has been
discussed with almost daily regularity beyond that date, and now
has languished without any definitive proposals from September
2008, when the two current leaders commenced direct talks
intended to reach a final settlement? In this year, 2010, we are
looking back 36 years to 1974 and 47 years to 1963. "A lot of time
has gone by, which writes its own history.... " 7
The international community has lost interest in the Cyprus
Problem, leaving only "the boring, tasteless and shallow
reverberating voices of some politicians: 'We shall never sell out,
we shall never yield."'5 8 The same politicians who proclaim that
"[i]n the new year, we shall celebrate. , 9 Notwithstanding these
proclamations, there are those Greek Cypriots who feel that their
"timid, foolish and spineless policies over the past years (despite
the objections of some of us) have probably led to a total loss." 60
Most people in Cyprus have never delved into or made an in-
depth analysis of our problem. They limit themselves to
sloganeering. They do not even care to get to know the
substance of what they approve and what they reject. They
simply aim at perfection, as if they were perfect themselves
down the historical course.
54. Stavrinides, supra note 24, at 97.
55. Id. at 98.
56. Id.
57. Nicos A. Rolandis, After So Many "Nos" Shall we Whisper "Yes, We Can"?,
CYPRUS MAIL, Jan. 11, 2009, http://www.cyprus-
mail.com/news/main.php?id=43451&archive=l. Rolandis is a former foreign minister of
the Republic of Cyprus.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
2009]
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They consider themselves as victims of injustice. As if they
- and their side - have never wronged anyone. They
continuously seek what they consider as better and they forsake
what is good or mediocre or tolerable. They chase chimaera. No
wonder we have reached an almost deadlocked position. No
wonder that our options become more and more limited with
the lapse of time. No wonder that even moderate and patient
Christofias at times wonders whether the reunification of
Cyprus is feasible.
... When I resigned from the post of Minister of Foreign
Affairs in September 1983, I warned that because of our
mentality and approach we would simply be left at the end of
the day "with a number of resolutions and the military
occupation of our country".
This is exactly what will happen if Christofias and Talat
fail to deliver. 61
The question that demands an answer is why, after all these
years and so many efforts internally and internationally is the
problem still apparently irresolvable and intractable, leaving the
parties without a negotiated agreement?
III. THE NEGOTIATION CULTURE OF LENGTHY PEACE PROCESSES:
CYPRUS AS AN EXAMPLE OF TRADITIONAL SPOILING
It has been suggested that the history of unsuccessful
negotiation of ethno-national conflicts demonstrates the need to
analyze how pre-negotiation efforts can assist in achieving success
in formal negotiations that follow. 62 In the case of the Cyprus
negotiations, there is indication that the pre-negotiation process
61. Id. Demetris Christofias is the newly elected president of the Republic of Cyprus
(Greek Cypriot) who has been negotiating with the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali
Talat since September 2008. He succeeded former president Tassos Papadopoulos in 2008.
Republic of Cyprus, Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus: Curriculum Vitae, available at
http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/prcOl-en/prcOl-en?opendocumen
t (last visited May 18, 2009). Nicos A. Rolandis served in the following Republic of Cyprus
positions: Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1983), Minister of Commerce, Industry &
Tourism (1998-2003), Member of the House of Representatives (1991-1996), President of
the Liberal Party (1986-1998), and Vice-President of Liberal International (1994-1998).
Cyprus-American Business Association, American Chamber of Commerce in Cyprus,
Biography on Nicos A. Rolandis. CyABA.com.cy, available at
http://www.cyaba.com.cy/main/default.aspx?tablD=l&itemlD=177&mid=223 (last visited
May 18, 2009).
62. Amira Schiff, Prenegotiation and its Limits in Ethno-National Conflicts: A
Systematic Analysis of Process and Outcomes'in the Cyprus Negotiations, 13 INT'L NEG.
387,388 (2008).
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from 2003 to 2004 was deficient because its sole purpose was to
enable the two respective leaders to "reap specific benefits" and
was not "based on the parties' perceived need to reach an
agreement."63 They engaged in a pre-negotiation "game-theory"
process that was cooperative but was followed by "negotiations
that would no longer be open-ended." 64The Annan Plan did not
provide the BATNA for either leader and thus "neither party had
any interest in making any binding threats toward the other during
the negotiations."'65 Thus, the exercise became "a cooperative
game without binding threats" that translated to a "strictly non-
cooperative game., 66 Failing to reach agreement provided
"disagreement payoffs," which encouraged use of conflict
strategies designed to maximize those payoffs.67 The parties
expressed a lack of flexibility, highlighted the lack of seriousness of
the other negotiator, and emphasized the advantages of non-
agreement over an agreement concerning the proposed plan. Thus,
both Denktash and Papadopoulos contributed to the negotiation
failure.66
Each leader operated from the standpoint of "his perception
of internal and external threats to his status."6 9 For example,
Denktash was more concerned about pressure exerted on him by
Turkey than that coming from the international community.T" In
the case of the Cyprus negotiations, it seems that both leaders felt
secure in resorting to their initial positions in opposing the plan
when they exhorted their respective constituencies to reject it at
the polls in voting on the referendum in each community.7 It is
interesting to note that the two leaders came to the bargaining
table as a result of pressure from outside third parties while
believing that no agreement would be the best alternative to the
Annan Plan. 72
"The pre-negotiation stage is designed to be a transition
phase that allows the parties to shift from adversarial perceptions
63. Id. at 407.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 407-408.
70. Id. at 408.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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and behaviors to collaborative perceptions and behaviors." 3 The
Cyprus pre-negotiation process regarding adoption of the Annan
Plan was intended to begin the problem solving process uniting the
opposing parties "against the problem."7 Each was supposed to
consider the interests and underlying needs of the other along with
those of their own. Instead, the result was simply a means of
managing the current circumstances. 75 Had the leaders been willing
to change their beliefs and expectations, they might have been
successful in considering "options entailing negotiations and
compromise." 6 They may have succeeded in electing "the option
of conflict resolution through negotiation as an alternative to the
unilateral track" 7 that ultimately resulted in failure of efforts to
resolve the decades-old divisive dispute.
In analyzing how the two leaders could have been successful,
it is necessary to consider what factors would have contributed to
de-escalation of the conflict. 7'8 This would have required changes in
their respective political positions, perceptions of the conflict,
reasons for negotiating, and readiness to negotiate and implement
any agreement reached.79 While there is no guarantee of success
for even those pre-negotiations that proceed as planned," eventual
positive results of the actual negotiations will depend on the
foundation established and pursued during the pre-negotiation
process. This foundation is based on the following:
* Jointly exploring the risks of reaching agreement.
* Assessing the costs of reaching agreement.
* Looking for alternatives to the problem.
* Setting an agenda for negotiations.
* Commitment to reciprocity in concessions.
* Seeking domestic support from both communities.
* Working toward perceptual changes from zero-sum to
win-win.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 389.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 389-90.
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0 Careful and restrained intervention by outside third
parties. -
The UN, EU, US, and to some extent Greece and Turkey,
intervened as third parties and, along with Denktash and
Papadopoulos, contributed in various ways to the failure of the
process. 3 US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has
announced that the Obama administration does "not plan to
impose anything... [but] would like to support as far as we can
the negotiations and we consider the best result to be a solution
based on a two-zone and two-community federation."'
Although the pre-negotiation process approach is helpful in
working toward a positive platform to support a potentially
satisfactory negotiation outcome, it nevertheless relies primarily
on the intentions and actions of the principal negotiators and the
involved outside third party interveners. This is "one of the most
complicated political cases, which the 20th century left us with."'
As the Cyprus case demonstrates, there must be an additional
element to provide the impetus to "close the deal" when necessary
and create the most favorable climate for successful
implementation following the reaching of an agreement. The
grassroots communities of civil society on both sides of the division
provide that additional critical element.86
IV. ABSENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY REPRESENTATION AT THE
BARGAINING TABLE HAS A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE POTENTIAL
FOR SETTLEMENT
There appears to have been "no serious attempt" made to
"empirically establish the relationship between the pre-negotiation
stage and final negotiation results."87 In the case of the Cyprus
Problem, the numerous failures over the years regarding the
negotiations can only be classified as pre in nature. This has left
members of both communities as "apathetic and cynical," causing
82. Id. at 391-92.
83. Id. at 393-406.
84. See U.S. Does Not Plan to Impose Solution to Cyprus Issue, FOCUS
INFORMATION AGENCY, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.focus-fen.net (last visited May 5, 2009)
(on file with author).
85. See Maria Spassova, Five Years After Rejecting the Annan's Plan, Cyprus is Still
Searching for Solutions, GR REPORTER, Apr. 23, 2009,
http://www.grreporter.info/en/node/680.
86. See Rethinking the Cyprus Problem, supra note 2, at 501.
87. See Schiff, supra note 62, at 389.
2009]
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them to "vote the way their preferred parties indicate in any new
referendum."' This is indicative of the need to bring the
grassroots civil society into the process, something that has not
been done to date.
In an effort "to reiterate that this status quo in Cyprus was
unacceptable and that both sides sought -a bizonal, bicommunal
federation, and... to establish a new procedure to prepare the
ground for substantive negotiations for a Cyprus settlement,"
Papadopoulos and Talat, the current Turkish Cypriot leader, met
with UN Under Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari on July 8,
2006, in the divided island's capital city of Nicosia.89 Without
reference to the Annan Plan, the two leaders agreed to create four
technical committees that would "discuss matters of day-to-day
concern" and several working groups that would discuss basic
issues dealing with the Cyprus Problem.9" During the following
months the discussions in the working groups and technical
meetings concentrated on the political structure of the proposed
new state and the efforts by Greek Cypriots to obtain agreement
from Turkish Cypriots to cease building and development on
Greek-owned properties in the North, without any consideration
for such a moratorium.91 The Turkish Cypriots refused. Thus,
while Greek Cypriots may have thought they preserved much by
voting against the referendum, actually they lost at least three
major areas on the island to development'and building activities of
Turkish Cypriots, "circumstances which helped unleash what
Greek Cypriot media call 'a building orgasm."' 92
It was never Talat's intention to permit the Gambari
Agreement to replace the Annan Plan.93 On the other hand,
Papadopoulos, notwithstanding charges that his "do-nothing
policy" and his "poor diplomatic record" dealing with the Cyprus
Problem resulted in "the cementing of the de facto partition of the
island," sought to ignore the Plan.9' Papadopoulos intended the
Gamabari Agreement to be the vehicle for preparation of the talks
so that the Annan Plan would not come to the table again.9' So
88. See Stavrinides, supra note 24.
89. Id. at 93-94.
90. Id. at 94.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 95.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 96.
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while Papadopoulos was attempting to obtain Talat's consent to
abide by the Gambari Agreement and authorize Turkish Cypriot
officials to immediately start work, Talat was expressing his
interest in having officials initiate preliminary work as the
preparation for subsequent substantive negotiations that would
involve the two leaders on a schedule that could achieve final
settlement by the end of the year (2008). 6 Papadopoulos resisted
any imposition of a time limit and insisted that negotiations
between the two leaders could not start before the technical
committees and working groups had completed their work in
framing the issues that were the cause of the division. '
Today the Turkish Cypriots are stronger economically and
politically than they have been during earlier efforts to reunify the
island.98 The irony is that while Papadopoulos was banking on
"Cyprus in the EU and Turkey knocking at the door," ' Talat and
the Turkish leadership could be contemplating a scenario whereby
possible recognition of the TRNC by even a handful of Islamic
governments with resulting links to EU states regarding direct
trade and transport would cause the Greek Cypriots to capitulate
to a settlement that would greatly reduce the amount of land to be
returned to them. 100 Once again, it is a question of weighing the
respective determination of each side as to what are their best
alternatives to a negotiated agreement.
Clearly apparent in this conflict over a divided island that
could be reunited under terms and conditions that will improve the
quality of life for all residents and stabilize this important area that
is the crossroads from the Middle East to Europe, is the exclusion
of civil society from the bargaining table. Perhaps these repeated
failures will lead to the design of a pre-negotiation process that will
affect positively the formal negotiations that follow. It only serves
to perpetuate the failures of the past if we argue that: 101
* The pre-negotiation process and subsequent formal
negotiations are and should remain the province of the
political elite from the top down, because they "reflect
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 97.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 98.
101. See Stavrinides, supra note 24.
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the wishes and needs" of most members of the
respective communities.
* The community members would start negotiating
where the two leaders have left off.
* "[T]he two leaders and the establishments in their
communities have the political experience and realism
to see they cannot get from negotiations what they
would ideally like."
" A majority of the people on both sides "are apathetic
and cynical by now" and "they will vote the way their
preferred parties indicate in any new referendum."
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR AN APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT OF THE
PRE-NEGOTIATION PROCESS TO EFFECTIVELY FACILITATE THE
POSITIVE OUTCOME OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS
After a history of colonialism followed by havoc and internal
fighting inflamed by hatred resulting in civil war, arrival of foreign
troops, displacement of thousands of people, loss of lives,
destruction of entire families, and loss of land, it is time to search
for a different approach to resolution of this conflict. It is time for
a new look that can reach the attitudes and prejudices
encompassed in the mutually utilized term, "The Other." 102 This
means the exploration and consideration of attitudes, hatreds,
prejudices, and demonizing that are reachable only at that level of
civil society that permits resort to the commonality of the
humanity of those locked in conflict.
The potential of the pre-negotiation process was not fully
achieved for several reasons. 103 Among these were the failure to
jointly explore the risks of agreement, understand the high cost of
non-agreement, express belief in reciprocity, establish support
from their respective communities, communicate the respective
differences between the leaders defining the problems and
necessary solutions, and create a genuine approach to
reconciliation setting the stage for perceptual changes. "
Additionally, strong manipulation by the outside third parties such
102. See generally YIANNIS PAPADAKIS, ECHOES FROM THE DEAD ZONE: ACROSS
THE CYPRUS DIVIDE (2005) (exploring the attitudes and prejudices that run deep in the
Greek Cypriot world and seeking to discover "The Other" - the much maligned Turks).
103. See Schiff, supra note 62, at 400-06.
104. Id. at 401-04.
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as the UN, EU, US, Greece and Turkey, failed to accomplish
entirely the critical functions of effective pre-negotiation. 10
As predicted, the efforts of the political elite have failed.
Javier Perez de Cuellar served as the Secretary-General of the UN
from 1982-1991.107 He is of the firm belief that the Cyprus Problem
is not "easily susceptible to a reasonable solution." 10
It should be a matter of finding the right formulas that would
afford the Turkish Cypriot minority-about 14-percent of the
population - a satisfactory degree of cultural and political
autonomy and a proportionate share of the island's territory
while preserving the integrity of a federated Cypriot state
government, in which both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots
would participate. Finding the formula and gaining its
acceptance by the two deeply mistrustful ethnic communities,
however, has proven until now impossible. After my own
sustained effort of more than 12 years, I would characterize the
Cyprus problem as a maze in which each promising pathway
leads back to the starting point. 109
The two current leaders, Christofias and Talat, have been
meeting since September 2008 and, although not successful, there
appears to have been some expression of optimism from each as to
a possible final settlement by autumn 2009. 10 Christofias has been
accused of abandoning the Annan Plan "and renegotiating the
entire settlement from scratch, [making] it... obvious that he
would enter [into] an interminable and unproductive procedure
that would not lead to a deal even in 10 years." .. Christofias has
charged that the Turkish Cypriots are really looking for a
confederation rather than a federation by attempting to weaken
the proposed federal government's role and functions. 112 Not to be
105. Id. at 404-06.
106. JAVIER PtREZ DE CUtLLAR, PILGRIMAGE FOR PEACE: A SECRETARY-
GENERAL'S MEMOIR 25 (1997) ("[S]omething more than perfection was required to bring
agreement between the Greek and Turkish communities .....
107. Id. at ix.
108. See id. at 215.
109. Id.
110. Stefanos Evripidou, Christoflas More Optimistic After Talks than Before, CYPRUS
MAIL, Feb. 13,2009, http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.php?id=44010&catid=l.
111. Loucas Charalambous, President's Handling of Talks Hardly Inspires Confidence,
CYPRUS MAIL, Jan. 18, 2009, http://www.cyprus-
mail.com/news/main.php?id=43585&cat-id=l.
112. Mu Xuequan, Rival Cypriot Communities Accuse Each Other for Lack of
Progress on Reunification Talks, CHINA VIEW, Jan. 14, 2009,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/14/content_10653309.htm.
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outdone, the Turkish Cypriots claim that Greek Cypriots are
defaming the Turkish Cypriots position in the negotiations. 113
Since the Greek Cypriots rejected "the only comprehensive
settlement plan prepared by the UN in the last [41] years" 114
despite prior acceptance by Turkish Cypriots, other avenues need
to be explored to move the conflict to a level where it can be
resolved, if still possible. Otherwise, the extensive history of
spoiling will likely repeat itself once again. "For several decades,
the UN has continuously worked to persuade the two communities
to find a viable solution to the Cyprus issue, ,.. but the so-called
peace process continues just as it has for several decades, without
any positive results. One yet to be tried approach may be the only
alternative remaining with potential for providing a solution:
Facilitation of civil society discourse through grassroots efforts by
citizens on either side of the Green Line.
To accomplish this, it is necessary to look to the human
condition and not the political realities. Cypriots need to feel they
are "Cypriots first, and then Greeks or Turks." 116 In doing so, they
must rise above:
[T]he hard years [they] went through in the 1960s, when a
negligible number of citizens only believed in their country and
her national symbols... Years during which Greeks and Turks
considered Cyprus as a "transit station" to union with Greece
(Enosis) for the Greeks and to partition.., or total Turkish
occupation for the Turks. 117
During those years "beautiful people" lived in Cyprus, "fully
dedicated to their motherland! A motherland in which they never
believed - they employed all possible methods to exterminate
her... [which] they eventually achieved." .18 The "mentality of
many people," however, "remains unaltered since then .... [T]he
more [they] suffer the less [they] learn in [their] country." 19 In the
words of former Cyprus Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicos
Rolandis:
113. Id.
114. See Charalambous, supra note 111.
115. See Xuequan, supra note 112 (emphasis added).
116. See Nicos A. Rolandis, The Beautiful People, Enosis, Partition . . . and Our
Bloody Mess, - CYPRUS MAIL, Feb. 15, 2009, http://www.cyprus-
mail.com/news/main.php?id=44065&archive=l [hereinafter The Beautiful People].
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Each community has built its own cause through its own
separate angle. It firmly believes that justice and principles are
on its own side. And each one has erected its own ideological
castle along the following lines:
Greek Cypriot Case: [They] fought in 1955-59 for union
with Greece, a venerable and sacred right. In 1960 they were
compelled to veer to independence, which however was not just
and balanced. So, they endeavoured to make the necessary
corrections in 1963, keeping alive, in parallel, their irrepressible
desire for union with Greece. In the meantime the Turkish
Cypriots kept undermining the Cyprus Republic and they
revolted in 1963. Later on, the treacherous junta came to power
in Greece. It destabilised Makarios 12' and together with EOKA
B 121 carried out the coup in 1974. Turkey invaded and brought
havoc to Cyprus, to this day occupying 37 per cent of the
territory of the Republic. There are currently around 1,500
Greek Cypriot missing persons. The various Plans of the United
Nations cannot be accepted because they do not safeguard in a
just way the rights of the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots
and Turkey are to blame for whatever goes wrong in Cyprus.
Turkish Cypriot Case: [The] Greek Cypriots fought in
1955-59 for union with Greece, ignoring the rights of the
Turkish Cypriots. Eventually the Republic of Cyprus was
established, which the Greek Cypriots incessantly undermined.
In 1963, Makarios tried to destroy the constitutional order. In
the 1960s the Turkish Cypriots were forced to live in enclaves
and the Greek Cypriots were aiming at their annihilation. In
1974 the Greek Cypriots and the Greek Junta tried to achieve
union with Greece through the coup d'etat. Turkey intervened
to save the Turkish Cypriots but still many of them perished
and 500 are [sic] missing. Because of the above, the Turkish
Cypriots believe that the two communities must live apart
under a very loose federation. The Greek Cypriots and Greece
are to blame for whatever goes wrong in Cyprus. 12
Meanwhile, the international players removed themselves
from the conflict between both communities. On the one hand, the
Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus was recognized formally. On
the other, the international players endorsed "pragmatic
120. Archbishop Makarios III, head of the Greek Orthodox church in Cyprus and the
first president of the new republic that was created in 1960 upon achieving independence
from Great Britain.
121. Paramilitary organization dedicated to achieving enosis.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
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positions" that "are not palatable to many Cypriots."23 The
current peace talks in Cyprus take place under an "unstable
atmosphere." 124 It appears that the following are the subject of
negotiation:
[Tihe Greek Cypriot position of electing the President and the
Vice President on a single list by the whole electorate is [not]
correct and sustainable. In such a case the Greek Cypriots will
determine who the Turkish Cypriot President/ Vice President
will be, because they constitute the majority of the electorate.
Such a Greek Cypriot privilege did not exist even in the 1960
constitution.
The Turkish Cypriot side cannot insist that Turkey should
have the right to a military intervention in Cyprus, which is a
member of the European Union and to which Turkey aspires to
accede. Besides, such a "right" is prohibited by the United
Nations Charter and by European laws and regulations. Under
such an arrangement shall we not legalise the aggression of one
state against another?
As far as the question of property rights are concerned...
neither the absolute positions of Talat nor those of Christofias
will lead anywhere. There are many resolutions of the United
Nations which propose a methodology on this issue. But most
importantly we have the 1977 Makarios-Denktas Agreement,
which provides that matters of principle, like "the right to
property are open for discussion, taking into consideration the
fundamental basis of a bicommunal federal system and certain
practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot
Community". This Agreement, if there is good faith, may
constitute the golden mean. "'
Failure to achieve a settlement most likely will result in
partition. 126 The present "relatively tranquil status quo" is not
something capable of indefinite preservation. ," There is even talk
of a "Taiwanisation" process " that will accelerate and consolidate
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See International Crisis Group, Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition 1,
EUROPE REPORT No. 190, Jan. 10, 2008,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5945&1 =1 (last visited June 9, 2009).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 25-26. Turkish Cypriots could begin to see their part of the island as their
homeland and will be committed to express loyalty to it. This will emphasize the
importance of a separate Turkish Cypriot culture rather than including Turkish Cypriots
solely as part of the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus, not unlike the movement for a
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partition. " Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, and Turkey all will
suffer if this comes to pass. ' Renewal of stressful relations
between the EU and NATO, long years of EU and Turkey
friction, increased division between Christians and Muslims, and
the possibility of new military tensions arising on the southeastern
edge of the EU will also be the price paid for failure to reunify the
island. 131
According to the ancient Greek playwright Aeschylus,
listening "to one of two sides, [one] learns only half the truth." 132
Christofias and Talat must therefore "listen carefully to each other
and seek justice after taking into account the arguments, the
mistakes, the omissions and the sins of all Cypriots. Otherwise,
Cyprus will remain divided into two parts, which does not serve
the interests of either the Greek or the Turkish Cypriots." 133 Both
sides will benefit by another effort at reunification that will take
place sooner than later. M Because of the length of time already
lost, the Greek Cypriots should move quickly. 135 With every
passing year the argument becomes stronger for those who
question whether forcing "two people who have lived apart for so
long to cohabit closely is really a viable option." 136 This view only
becomes stronger as reunification continues to be delayed. 37 As it
is, the prediction that Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan
in 2004 would make any following effort much less favorable to
them seems likely to be the reality. 38 Recent polling disclosed that
five years after the divided referendum results, most of the Turkish
Cypriot community would now reject the Annan Plan if given a
chance to vote again. 139
separate Taiwanese culture separate from China.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See Hugh Pope, Cyprus: "Things are Looking Up", INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP, Sep. 17, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5731&1=1 (last
visited June 9, 2009).
132. The Beautiful People, supra note 116.
133. Id.
134. JAMES KER-LINDSAY, EU ACCESSION AND UN PEACEMAKING IN CYPRUS 136
(2005).
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Today Most of Turkish Cypriots Would Reject Annan Plan: Poll, FOCUS
INFORMATION AGENCY, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.focus-fen.net (last visited March 5,
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In order to accomplish what Rolandis has urged (to consider
"the arguments, the mistakes, the omissions and the sins of all
Cypriots" "), it is necessary that Cypriot civil society on both sides
of the Green Line be able to express their interests and underlying
needs at the bargaining table. 1' Active community participation
will help ensure the success of the negotiation process and
subsequent efforts to implement any agreement. 142 But even this is
not enough. The people on the ground on either side must first
listen to and fully hear each other in order to put themselves in the
shoes of the other and understand what the other is feeling from
the other's point of view. This is the process of humanization that
reverses the negative effect of demonization and enables parties in
conflict to empathize with each other without blaming or judging.
Demonization is a process by which "we define our enemies"
through accusations of evil. 143 "The ultimate purpose of every
accusation of evil is... to create the self-permission, win the
approval of outsiders, and establish the moral logic required to
justify committing evil oneself." " The principal elements to
demonization include: 145
" The other side intended to cause us harm.
* All ideas or statements made by the other side are
either wrong or submitted for dishonest purposes.
* Everything negative is the fault of the other side.
* The other side wants to destroy our values and us so
we need to destroy them first.
* Benefits to the other side will harm us, and harm to
them will benefit us.
" Criticism of us or praise for the other side is an act of
disloyalty and treason.
2009) (on file with author). Results among 1,387 residents of Northern Cyprus: 53.8%
against, 27.9% favorable, 3.15% don't know, and 15.1% undecided.
140. The Beautiful People, supra note 116.
141. See generally Anthony Wanis-St. John &-Darren Kew, Civil Society and Peace
Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion, 13 INT'L NEG. 11 (2008) (finding, upon survey of a
wide variety of different peace processes, a strong correlation between active civil society
participation in peace negotiations and the durability of peace during the peace building
phase).
142. Id. at 33.
143. See KENNETH CLOKE, CONFLICT REVOLUTION: MEDIATING EVIL, WAR,
INJUSTICE AND TERRORISM: How MEDIATORS CAN HELP SAVE THE PLANET 181
(2008).
144. Id. at 179.
145. Id. at 182-83.
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* Without exception, all oni the other side are enemies.
" If you are not with us you are against us.
" We have nothing in common with the other side and it
is dangerous to consider them human.
* It is impossible to conduct dialogue with the other side
or negotiate or cooperate with them to resolve the
conflicts we have with them.
* The evil represented by the other side gives us
permission to act with hostility toward them, just as
they feel and act toward us.
Dismantling the wall erected by demonization presents a
difficult challenge. 6 This is especially true concerning the Cyprus
Problem that has existed for so long in a perpetual and self-
energizing manner. It is possible, however, to "deconstruct and
transform" the elements of demonization through the use of
mediation. "' An important part of this is the "need to recognize
the ways that attribution of evil are subtly reflected in the language
and syntax we use to describe our conflicts, enemies, issues, and
selves." " It will be necessary to create a balance "between looking
back to 'neutralize history' and looking forward to build a new
society." 149 The current thinking is that both looking back and
looking forward are necessary. "' Without intensely looking at the
atrocities of the past there is not much hope of achieving "a new,
transformed society." ... There will be more future problems if
there is a failure to examine past crimes. '52 How this is
accomplished will depend on local demand and local culture,
although it is "not the same as forgetting the past [but instead] it is
the 'ability to separate the past from the present - to see the past
as the past."' 153 This process must be comfortable in terms of local
demand and culture, aiming "for as much closure as possible on
the horrors of the past." ' An important consideration is that the
structural changes the two leaders are attempting may not succeed
146. Id. at 183.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. STEPHEN RYAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIOLENT INTERCOMMUNAL
CONFLICT 159 (2007).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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in achieving transformative change if these efforts fail to "modify
the hearts and minds of the individuals caught up in the violence"
and address the specific needs of the very people living in the
communities under siege. "' And the customary consideration of
truth and then reconciliation would best be reversed because it is
only after reconciliation has been commenced that the truth can
surface. 156
Because one side's attempt to do justice on their own terms in
the aftermath of conflict will be viewed by the other side as a way
of continuing or resuming the war by "judicial means," the
preferable approach is to use power politics and search for an
accommodation that is mutually acceptable, ignore the past, and
move on to build a peaceful future. 157 If the parties are to work to
avoid repeating the past, however, an agreement must be reached
regarding the nature of the wrongs committed and how the future
will be different. '58 A rational consensus needs to be built
concerning a description of the past so that a reasonable
agreement can be reached regarding the "terrible things" that
were done. '59 "The possibility of building consensus about
contested history, about who was the real victim and who was the
real oppressor, holds out the possibility of agreement about what a
just burying of the past would be." " Since prosecution of human
rights violations could jeopardize peace in the aftermath of civil
conflict, prudence dictates that the political process permit
constraints on the retributive portion of the effort. 61 Indeed, even
the victims have a stake in the future where their rights will be
considered. 162
Ironically, the negotiation process can worsen a conflict.'
63
While pre-negotiation is essential to prepare the grassroots for the
formal negotiations, an effective confidence-building approach is a
155. Id. at 160.
156. Nigel Biggar, Conclusion, in BURYING THE PAST: MAKING PEACE AND DOING
JUSTICE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 309 (Nigel Biggar ed., 2003).
157. Id. at 310.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 310-12.
160. Id. at 312.
161. Id. at 313.
162. Id.
163. JAY ROTHMAN, RESOLVING IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT IN NATIONS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 87 (1997).
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necessity. " As was emphasized by U.S. secretary of state James
Baker in referring to the 1991 Middle East Peace Conference:
[Y]ou have failed to deal adequately with the human dimension
of the conflict .... Support for a negotiating process will not be
sustained unless the human dimension is addressed by all
parties. A way must be found to send signals of peace and
reconciliation that affect the people of the region.
To accomplish this, the antagonism, resonance, invention, and
action (ARIA) approach, advanced by Jay Rothman," was
designed.and applied in the historical conflict between the Israelis
and the Palestinians. 167 The process in brief:
* Antagonism is dealt with by asking the parties to
express their respective views of the problem, state
how they view the other side in terms of the issue,
describe what limited resources are at stake, and
summarize their respective positions on the outcomes
they Would like to achieve in future negotiations. "
* Resonance is the surfacing of the human dimension
existing underneath the antagonistic positions of each
through providing the groundwork for understanding,
expressing interactive introspection, and meshing the
respective needs of the parties. 169
* Invention consists of brainstorming various possible
approaches to a solution through the establishment of
a statement of principles to be used related to five
functional areas of mutual concern: security,
economics, education, municipal services and
governance, and cultural expression. "'
* Action deals with the consideration of the results of
the work product of the mixed teams that suggest
definite confidence-building initiatives to deal with the
164. Id.
165. Id. at 87-88.
166. Id. at 88. Jay Rothman was the director of the Jerusalem Peace Initiative from
1992-1994. Sponsored by the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Peace Initiative conducted conflict
resolution, dialogue, and training workshops between Israelis and Palestinians for various
student, community, and political groups.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 88-91.
169. Id. at 91-96.
170. Id. at 97-102.
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five policy proposals set forth under Invention,
directed to project planning, institution building, and
negotiation. 171
In order to successfully accomplish the application of the
ARIA approach, it is necessary that the parties in conflict be
willing to transform their fighting and antagonism into
"constructive engagement and resonance." 172 This can be achieved
through the concept of a "Just Peace." 173 Just Peace is "a process
whereby peace and justice are reached together by two or more
parties recognizing each others' identities, each renouncing some
central demands, and each accepting to abide by common rules
jointly developed." 174 The concept of a Just Peace is language-
oriented 7.and anticipates:
" Negotiators jointly building "a new common
language" that redefines certain elements of their
identity. 176
* Employment of a "bottom-up" approach that proposes
"an accommodation process whereby negotiators seek
to agree to a fair and lasting peace by crafting it in a
manner deemed just by all relevant protagonists." 177
Peace so achieved is just because:
* It is the result of an evolving recognition by the
negotiators that there is a "series of conventions." 178
* It is expressed in a shared language that is sensitively
respectful of all parties. 179
* It "does not reflect a blinkered vision of law."
According to this approach, four generally accepted principles
are required to negotiate a peace that will be perceived as just and
legitimate:
* Thin recognition.
• Thick recognition.
171. Id. at 102-08.
172. Id. at 167.
173. See Pierre Allan & Alexis Keller, The Concept of a Just Peace, or Achieving Peace
Through Recognition, Renouncement, and Rule, in WHAT IS A JUST PEACE? 195 (Pierre
Allan & Alexis Keller eds. 2006).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 196.
176. Id.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. ld.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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* Renouncement.
* Common rule. 181
Adjustment to the prevailing circumstances is necessary. The four
principles or conventions are not a list of requirements, but rather
a process for both the preconditions to a Just Peace and the steps
that will make it possible. 18
* As the first convention, Thin Recognition refers to the
fact that each party accepts the other as a human
being. 183
* As the second convention, Thick Recognition refers to
the fact that each party understands the fundamental
features of the other party's identity. "
* As the third convention, Renouncement refers to the
fact that concessions and compromise are required to
create a Just Peace. 15
* As the fourth convention, Rule refers to the fact that a
Just Peace must not be entirely subjective, but rather
out in the open within the view of the public with
explicit, legitimate, and objective rules for settlement,
acceptable behavior, and yardsticks so that all may
approve of any proposed solution. "'
The concept of a Just Peace requires that each party
understand and accept the fundamental identity of the other party,
especially those differences in features that it requires to maintain
its "self," so that there can be a "reaching out" of a universal
formula lumping all parties together. '87 The central feature of our
world is that there are many identities that demand recognition,
and they all need to be respected and honored. "
John Paul Lederach coined the term conflict transformation in
the 1980s. 18 This was an outgrowth of his belief that conflict is
normal between humans:
For me, conflict transformation is accurate because I am
181. Id. at 197.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 199.
185. Id. at 201.
186. Id. at 203-04.
187. Id. at 214.
188. Id. at 215.
189. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, THE LITTLE BOOK OF CONFLICr TRANSFORMATION 3
(2003).
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engaged in constructive change efforts that include, and go
beyond, the resolution of specific problems. It is scientifically
sound language because it is based on two verifiable realities:
conflict is normal in human relationships, and conflict is a
motor of change. Transformation provides a clear and
important vision because it brings into focus the horizon toward
which we journey-the building of healthy relationships and
communities, locally and globally. This goal requires real
change in our current ways of relating. '90
The term may "require a fundamental change in our way of
thinking." 191 Thus, if we are to examine the Cyprus Problem in
terms of management or resolution, we are looking at change per
se. Perhaps that is what has been the difficulty with "resolution" of
the problem on both sides of the Green Line. Since nothing else
has worked over the 45-year period during which this difficult
situation has presented itself to the international community, a
new approach is necessary. The parties must transform the conflict,
rather than continue to trudge in the morass of efforts to manage
or resolve. Irrespective of whether their feeling is that a continued
elite top-down approach is appropriate, or that a bottom-up
change should be encouraged, the emphasis needs to shift
dramatically from the two leaders who are working the floor as if
the dispute were theirs alone. The shift must involve members on
the ground in both communities so that they can learn and practice
the interactive human approach emphasized by a transformation
of their conflict.
Further, a "multilevel network model of peacebuilding helps
us understand ongoing peacebuilding projects in deeply divided
societies." 19
It calls attention to the interference of putative homeland elites
and the often dueling agendas of national-level and local-level
minority activists. It highlights persistent problems in other
models and practices of peacebuilding. These include
oversimplification of social relations and the bases of conflict,
shortcomings in the methods used to support the sustainability
of refugee returns, and assistance to civil society based more on
Western concepts than on an understanding of local
190. Id. at 4-5.
191. Id. at 5.
192. See PAULA M. PICKERING, PEACEBUILDING IN THE BALKANS: THE VIEW FROM
THE GROUND FLOOR 187 (2007).
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mechanisms with strong bases in recovering societies. Most
important, attention to the views of grassroots forces on
peacebuilding has helped reveal why the roots of postconflict
institutions in traumatized societies remain dangerously
shallow. Dismissing the enduring informal mechanisms that
ordinary people use to help address the everyday aspects of
reconstruction in favor of top-down formal institutions may well
be a serious impediment to peacebuilding efforts in the region.
The importance of listening to and observing ordinary people
struggling to cope in postwar societies cannot be overstated.
Although the preceding was written with respect to peacebuilding
efforts in the Balkans, it similarly serves as a reflection of the 45-
year history of attempts to bring peace to and reunify the island of
Cyprus.
The much-celebrated Talat-Christofias talks appear to be
deadlocked even though there are attempts to camouflage that
fact, "hoping, against all hope, that some miracle can still come
their way." 194 Instead, acrimony and anger have replaced the
cordiality that existed when the current talks began. '95 For
instance, Talat was accused of being the "uncompromising
partitionist leader" that Denktash personified. 196 Also, Talat
"accused Christofias of negotiating in bad faith, making
international agreements presuming that the existing Greek
Cypriot Republic will live forever." "
When the newly elected Greek Cypriot president, Christofias,
and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Talat, started their talks a year
ago, the atmosphere indicated that this was "the last real chance of
peace and reconciliation in Cyprus." 198 Christofias has, however,
effectively rejected the key provisions of the Annan Plan regarding
the property issues. " Furthermore, "the support is minimal at the
[Greek Cypriot] grass roots for a genuinely equal power sharing
with the Turkish Cypriots in a new State on the island." 20 Most
193. Id. at 187-88.
194. Ozay Mehmet, Guest Comment: The End of the Cyprus Problem,
FinancialMirror.com, Feb. 19, 2009,
http://www.financialmirror.com/Columnist/COMMENT/262.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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Greek Cypriots "do not want to give up the existing Greek Cypriot
Republic of Cyprus, now an EU member for any new State in
partnership with the Turkish Cypriots." 201
Most recently, the 35-year ban by Britain's Civilian Aviation
Authority concerning direct flights between UK airports and
Northern Cyprus was challenged in the Administrative Court (a
division of the UK High Court). 20 A decision in favor of the airline
challenger would effectively end the isolation of the Turkish
Cypriot community. 203 The challenge was traceable to former UK
Prime Minister Tony Blair's comments in May 2004. When visiting
Turkey, he commented on the isolation and inconvenience created
by the ban on direct flights to and from the northern part of the
island: "I think it is important. .. that we end the isolation of
Northern Cyprus .... That means lifting the embargoes in respect
to trade, and in respect to air travel." 20 In July 2009, however, the
challenge was defeated in the UK court and the request for review
of the current ban was dismissed. 205
As of October 17, 2004, new construction was booming in
the northern part of the island and Greek Cypriot land sales there
were "worth more than two billion dollars." 206 However, the top
court of the EU recently rendered a turning point decision that
allows Greek Cypriot courts to assert jurisdiction over these issues
favoring Greek Cypriot claims to ownership of their land in the
North.202
Exacerbating the problem are a couple key facts. First, the
EU may punish Turkey for refusing to open its ports to Greek
Cypriot shipping and refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the
201. Id.
202. See Max de Trense, Challenge to Ban on Direct Flights to Northern Cyprus Will
Be Heard in High Court, SYS-CON Media, Inc., Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.sys-
con.com/node/924037.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2.
205. See UK Court Says No to Direct Flights to the North, CYPRUS MAIL, July 29, 2009,
http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.php?id=47057&catid=l.
206. See Philippos Savvides, Written Evidence Submitted by Dr. Philippos Savvides,
Research Fellow, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (EL1A MEP), Oct.
17, 2004, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/
cmselect/cmfaff/ll3/4101901.htm (follow "Written evidence submitted by Dr. Philippos
Savvides" hyperlink).
207. See Helena Smith, Scent of Victory Among Lemon Trees as Displaced Cypriots
Win Claim on Ancestral Land: Displaced Greek Cypriots Celebrate Landmark Court
Ruling on Property Rights, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, May 1, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/0l/cyprus-displaced-european-union-greece.
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Greek Cypriot government. ° Second, Turkish Cypriots are
becoming "Turkified" because an increasing number of people
emigrated from Turkey since 1994, placing more of the North
under Turkey's dominance. ' The present course and progression
of the talks may eventually remove any incentive for either side to
negotiate. If that occurs, "the Christofias-Talat talks will simply
vanish. No one will walk away from the talks having accomplished
anything. Instead, any peacemaking attempts will melt away like
spring snow. And with that, the last hope for a united Cyprus will
also disappear." 210
That prophesy seems all too likely given the fact that Talat's
authority has been "shaken" following the right-wing National
Unity Party victories over his Republican Turkish Party in the
April 2009, Northern Cyprus parliamentary elections.2"' This
could result in the center-left Talat being replaced, or at least
joined, by another Turkish Cypriot in the negotiations,
notwithstanding statements by both the Turkish president and
prime minister that Talat is "the only negotiator" for them." 
212
Supporters of reunification can only hope that Talat's role as
negotiator will continue to be supported by the large number of
voters in the North who seek an agreement that provides E.U.
membership. 23 Adding to this uncertainty is the difficult issue of
"return or compensation of properties in the North owned by
Greek Cypriots displaced to the south.." .. The concern is that the
managing coalition of the Greek Cypriot republic's government is
in danger of falling apart because of criticism from Nikolas
Papadopoulos, deputy chairman of the Democratic Party and son
of the late president Tassos Papadopoulos, over the policies of
Christofias (who was Talat's political ally before the 1974 division)
regarding the Cyprus problem and his alleged concessions to
Talat. 215
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Spassova, supra note 85.
212. Id.
213. See Sven G. Simonsen, Cyprus: Are Old Friends Offering New Hope For Unity?,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 6, 2009,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0507/pO6sOl-woeu.html.
214. Id.
215. Id.; See also Will the Governing Coalition in Cyprus Collapse?, GR REPORTER,
Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.grreporter.info/en/node/645.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The last best hope for reunification of the island of Cyprus
rests in the hands of the people at the grassroots level on both
sides. They need to change the game through conflict
transformation from the bottom-up. This is their BATNA given
the current state of the stalled negotiation process. The goals that
must be pursued are personal, relational, structural, and cultural. 216
The grassroots communities need to develop their respective
capacities to cultivate personal practices that will:
" Present divisive issues as a window of opportunity.27
* Integrate the various time frames, present as well as
future. 21'
" Change the energies of conflict from an "either/or"
emphasis to one of "both/and frame of reference."219
* Convert complexity from an enemy to a
collaborator. 220
* Understand and respect the role of identity. 221
Such an endeavor is something new to the efforts to deal with
the conflict because it requires a decided shift from an adversarial
to a collaborative game. While this endeavor provides much hope
for success, it also faces a rough road to travel due to the historical
and traditional rut that has consumed efforts to solve the Cyprus
Problem. Many reasons contribute to the extreme difficulty of the
conflict, including the simple fact that Turkish Cypriots live on 37
percent of the island, but constitute only one-fifth of the island's
population. 22 They fear that a mandated property return under an
Annan Plan type of settlement would seal their minority social
status through. a smaller area allocated to their community, and
degrade economic opportunities because of their inability to
provide compensation to Greek Cypriot owners for the land that
would not be returned. 223
Adding to this difficulty is deep division over the system of
216. See Lederach, supra note 189, at 27.
217. Id. at 48.
218. Id. at 49-50.
219. Id. at 51-53
220. Id. at 53-54.
221. Id. at 55-60.
222. See Simonsen, supra note 213.
223. Id. Returning Greek Cypriot owned land would further reduce their territory,
while retaining the land would not be possible because of Turkish Cypriot financial
inability to compensate the Greek Cypriot owners.
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government following reunification. Turkish Cypriot insistence on
minority rights is pitted against Greek Cypriot emphasis on
individual rights, and the dilemma posed by "citizenship rights for
tens of thousands of settlers from Turkey." 224 Greek Cypriots seek
a future that resembles the past, "a Greek-Cypriot-dominated
virtually unitary Cyprus," and the Turkish Cypriots want one that
"resembles, as far as possible, the de facto two-state present." "'
This impasse is a result of the development of a dual personality
for the island known as "Dementia Cypria." 2 2 6
The ineffective manner of interaction that has been the model
for more than 45 years is all too easy to carry on. The challenge
that faces those who truly desire a reunification is the bravery
required to change course through education, training, and
adoption of the ARIA approach and to seek a Just Peace.
Emphasis needs to be redirected away from the island's factual
history, and instead to memories that deal effectively with the past
through present feelings in the everyday lives 27 of ordinary
Cypriots on both sides of the Green Line as they struggle with the
issues that continue to divide them. People on both sides need to
understand that the history of the conflict cannot be undone."
They must focus instead on sharing their memories, because those
are psychological expressions emanating from within themselves. "
Given the current atmosphere on the island in both communities,
the dwindling support from international outsiders, and the
security issue present for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots
because of the continued presence of Turkish troops in the North
supporting a TRNC government for which Turkey pays "at least a
third," " the future admittedly does not look bright.
For 35 years the respective leaders of the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot communities have consistently advocated separate sets of
"political and ethical beliefs and desires - rational and irrational"
that are "fundamentally incompatible."" So how can the current
224. Id.
225. See Zenon Stavrinides, Dementia Cypria: On the Social Psychological
Environment of the Intercommunal Negotiations, 21 CYPRUS REV. 175, 175-86 (2009)
[hereinafter Dementia Cypria].
226. Id.
227. See RACHEL MACNAIR, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PEACE 123-25 (2003).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Simonsen, supra note 213.
231. See Dementia Cypria, supra note 225.
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leaders who carry the baggage of their respective predecessors
suddenly change course and ask their followers to throw off their
historical shackles in order to join together for peace? How "can
the two leaders ever acknowledge (the true history) to their own
people and tell them that they do not deserve to get all they are
demanding, as the other side also has just grievances and must
secure their rights and protection?"" Even assuming those
possibilities, how could these leaders "retain their authority with
their respective communities if they sought sanity in a world of
collective dementia?" 3 Political survival teaches otherwise.
It. is approaching two years since Christofias and Talat
commenced their direct interaction to solve the Cyprus problem
that remains the only armed conflict in the EU. ' The conflict
could remain an obstacle to Turkey's EU accession and
cooperation between NATO and the EU if Turkey cannot
perform the role of "regional peacemaker/peacekeeper" while it
acts as "a conduit for communications" with the expanded Middle
East and joins its growing economy with that of Europe. 5
There is a problem regarding how to ensure that each
community will be a full federal participant." 6 Apparently the
process has come down to who will blink first. 7 While some
commentators feel that the process so far has been "unfruitful,"
others insist that much has been accomplished. "' Some suggest
that the real decision makers are Christofias and Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (not Talat), which makes a
solution more difficult because Turkey has more to lose than gain
from conceding on key points. "
The situation is exacerbated further by the struggle between
the Islamists and the secularists in Turkey, and the fact that Talat
must face re-election in 2010.240 Talat's chances for re-election
presents a serious dilemma for the Greek Cypriots who are waiting
for the other side to concede. Delaying action until after the
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Stefanos Evripidou, The Talks: One Year On, CYPRUS MAIL, Aug. 30, 2009,
http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.php?id=47548&-id=l (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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Turkish Cypriot 2010 elections might result in Talat failing to be
re-elected and a hard-liner succeeding him. On the other hand, it is
hard to see how Talat can win in the absence of a solution. 21
Even assuming that a solution can be achieved, what will be
the result of the referenda that must follow any such agreement
between the negotiators for the two sides? The polls show that
what Turkish Cypriots may decide is no longer predictable because
they are much less positive than they were at the time of the 2004
referenda. 242 The elephant in the room is "the global economic
crisis." 243 In the event of a negative economic impact on Cyprus in
2010 that "coincides with substantial movement in the talks,"
potential prosperity for the island might be just the thing necessary
to surmount the historical obstacles that so far have prevented a
solution. 24
The UN has estimated that "9 out of 10 people on both sides
still have no contact with persons from the other community." 2
4 5
The critical element of reunification will be the degree of
willingness and determination of Cypriots to reject the ineffective
rote motions of so-called "technical committees and working
groups," and instead commit to becoming educated in the process
of humanization. ' Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike must possess
the strength to rise up and take destiny into their own hands while
simultaneously dealing with difficult economic conditions in both
communities. 247 These are extraordinary times for ordinary people
who truly have the opportunity to take charge of their future. The
question is whether they will seize the moment before it is too
241. Id. The election in fact took place following final submission of this article. Talat
lost to Dervis Eroglu, the prime minister, who won barely enough votes to avoid a runoff
with Talat. Subject to confirmation by the official electoral commission, the vote was
50.38% for Eroglu and 42.85% for Talat. One BBC analyst, Tabitha Morgan, indicated
that Eroglu's solution "would involve separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot states, linked
by loose confederal ties." This is something "totally unacceptable to the majority of Greek
Cypriots," so the chances of a negotiated settlement "suddenly look significantly worse."
According to another analyst, the disappointment of Turkish Cypriots resulted in an
attempt "to punish Mr. Talat" for failing in his efforts to reunite the island. See, Nationalist
Dervis Eroglu wins Northern Cyprus Election, BBc NEWS, April 18, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8627826stm (last visited April 18, 2010).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
2009]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
late. 48
248. See Simon Bahceli, Peace is Too Important to be Left to Politicians, CYPRUS
MAIL, April 2009, http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.php?id=46669&-id=l (last
visited July 7, 2009). Perhaps this question may be answered by ENGAGE, a fresh
bicommunal grassroots attempt to encourage involvement of civil society on both sides in
the efforts to achieve reunification and peace "despite and against the wishes of
incumbent political leadership." This would enable civil society to "effectively bypass
obstacles politicians found hard to get around." However, even this possibility could be
doomed to fail if the estimate proves accurate that in addition to "steadily leaving" the
island or moving to the Greek Cypriot south, Turkish Cypriots already may be
outnumbered when compared to the immigrant population from Turkey. See Hugh Pope,
Waiting for Miracles on Cyprus, CURRENT HISTORY (International Crisis Group), March
15, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6582&1=1 (last visited March 19,
2010).
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